openssl sets additional cflags in its configuration script. We need to
make it aware of our custom cflags to avoid adding conflicting cflags.
Fixes: #12866
Signed-off-by: Jitao Lu <dianlujitao@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 51f57e7c2dd2799e34036ec74b3436bf490fade0)
Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [30 May 2023]
*) Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.
OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
sub-identifier. (CVE-2023-2650)
To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT
IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT
IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise.
The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT
IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at
most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub-
identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of
the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with
these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586
bytes.
Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
[Richard Levitte]
*) Reworked the Fix for the Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption (CVE-2022-4304).
The previous fix for this timing side channel turned out to cause
a severe 2-3x performance regression in the typical use case
compared to 1.1.1s. The new fix uses existing constant time
code paths, and restores the previous performance level while
fully eliminating all existing timing side channels.
The fix was developed by Bernd Edlinger with testing support
by Hubert Kario.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to
David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0466)
[Tomas Mraz]
*) Fixed an issue where invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are
silently ignored by OpenSSL and other certificate policy checks are skipped
for that certificate. A malicious CA could use this to deliberately assert
invalid certificate policies in order to circumvent policy checking on the
certificate altogether. (CVE-2023-0465)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree to mitigate
against CVE-2023-0464. The default limit is set to 1000 nodes, which
should be sufficient for most installations. If required, the limit
can be adjusted by setting the OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX build
time define to a desired maximum number of nodes or zero to allow
unlimited growth. (CVE-2023-0464)
[Paul Dale]
Removed upstreamed patches.
Signed-off-by: Tianling Shen <cnsztl@immortalwrt.org>
Apply two patches fixing low-severity vulnerabilities related to
certificate policies validation:
- Excessive Resource Usage Verifying X.509 Policy Constraints
(CVE-2023-0464)
Severity: Low
A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit
this vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that
triggers exponential use of computational resources, leading to a
denial-of-service (DoS) attack on affected systems.
Policy processing is disabled by default but can be enabled by passing
the `-policy' argument to the command line utilities or by calling the
`X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()' function.
- Invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are silently ignored
(CVE-2023-0465)
Severity: Low
Applications that use a non-default option when verifying certificates
may be vulnerable to an attack from a malicious CA to circumvent
certain checks.
Invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are silently ignored
by OpenSSL and other certificate policy checks are skipped for that
certificate. A malicious CA could use this to deliberately assert
invalid certificate policies in order to circumvent policy checking on
the certificate altogether.
Policy processing is disabled by default but can be enabled by passing
the `-policy' argument to the command line utilities or by calling the
`X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()' function.
Note: OpenSSL also released a fix for low-severity security advisory
CVE-2023-466. It is not included here because the fix only changes the
documentation, which is not built nor included in any OpenWrt package.
Due to the low-severity of these issues, there will be not be an
immediate new release of OpenSSL.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
*) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
but subsequently interpreted by GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE. This
vulnerability may allow an attacker who can provide a certificate chain and
CRL (neither of which need have a valid signature) to pass arbitrary
pointers to a memcmp call, creating a possible read primitive, subject to
some constraints. Refer to the advisory for more information. Thanks to
David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0286)
This issue has been fixed by changing the public header file definition of
GENERAL_NAME so that x400Address reflects the implementation. It was not
possible for any existing application to successfully use the existing
definition; however, if any application references the x400Address field
(e.g. in dead code), note that the type of this field has changed. There is
no ABI change.
[Hugo Landau]
*) Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
be called directly by end user applications.
The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
(CVE-2023-0215)
[Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
will most likely lead to a crash.
The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
(CVE-2022-4450)
[Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
(CVE-2022-4304)
[Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario]
Signed-off-by: John Audia <therealgraysky@proton.me>
(cherry picked from commit 4ae86b3358a149a17411657b12103ccebfbdb11b)
The original commit removed the upstreamed patch 010-padlock.patch, but
it's not on OpenWrt 21.02, so it doesn't have to be removed.
Signed-off-by: Michal Vasilek <michal.vasilek@nic.cz>
Removed upstreamed patch: 010-padlock.patch
Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
*) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
but subsequently interpreted by GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE. This
vulnerability may allow an attacker who can provide a certificate chain and
CRL (neither of which need have a valid signature) to pass arbitrary
pointers to a memcmp call, creating a possible read primitive, subject to
some constraints. Refer to the advisory for more information. Thanks to
David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0286)
This issue has been fixed by changing the public header file definition of
GENERAL_NAME so that x400Address reflects the implementation. It was not
possible for any existing application to successfully use the existing
definition; however, if any application references the x400Address field
(e.g. in dead code), note that the type of this field has changed. There is
no ABI change.
[Hugo Landau]
*) Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
be called directly by end user applications.
The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
(CVE-2023-0215)
[Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
will most likely lead to a crash.
The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
(CVE-2022-4450)
[Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
(CVE-2022-4304)
[Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario]
Signed-off-by: John Audia <therealgraysky@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: Tianling Shen <cnsztl@immortalwrt.org>
9217ab4 ustream-openssl: Disable renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier
2ce1d48 ci: fix building with i.MX6 SDK
584f1f6 ustream-openssl: wolfSSL: provide detailed information in debug builds
aa8c48e cmake: add a possibility to set library version
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
(cherry picked from commit 69f0c29b8b3339ef93c04f6c7f92481e8e223e2f)
Changes between 1.1.1r and 1.1.1s [1 Nov 2022]
*) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1r version not refreshing the
certificate data to be signed before signing the certificate.
[Gibeom Gwon]
Changes between 1.1.1q and 1.1.1r [11 Oct 2022]
*) Fixed the linux-mips64 Configure target which was missing the
SIXTY_FOUR_BIT bn_ops flag. This was causing heap corruption on that
platform.
[Adam Joseph]
*) Fixed a strict aliasing problem in bn_nist. Clang-14 optimisation was
causing incorrect results in some cases as a result.
[Paul Dale]
*) Fixed SSL_pending() and SSL_has_pending() with DTLS which were failing to
report correct results in some cases
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1o for re-signing certificates with
different key sizes
[Todd Short]
*) Added the loongarch64 target
[Shi Pujin]
*) Fixed a DRBG seed propagation thread safety issue
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed a memory leak in tls13_generate_secret
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed reported performance degradation on aarch64. Restored the
implementation prior to commit 2621751 ("aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: avoid
32-bit lane assignment in CTR mode") for 64bit targets only, since it is
reportedly 2-17% slower and the silicon errata only affects 32bit targets.
The new algorithm is still used for 32 bit targets.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Added a missing header for memcmp that caused compilation failure on some
platforms
[Gregor Jasny]
Build system: x86_64
Build-tested: bcm2711/RPi4B
Run-tested: bcm2711/RPi4B
Signed-off-by: John Audia <therealgraysky@proton.me>
(cherry picked from commit a0814f04ed955eb10b25df0ce6666ed91f11ca1b)
Changes between 1.1.1r and 1.1.1s [1 Nov 2022]
*) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1r version not refreshing the
certificate data to be signed before signing the certificate.
[Gibeom Gwon]
Changes between 1.1.1q and 1.1.1r [11 Oct 2022]
*) Fixed the linux-mips64 Configure target which was missing the
SIXTY_FOUR_BIT bn_ops flag. This was causing heap corruption on that
platform.
[Adam Joseph]
*) Fixed a strict aliasing problem in bn_nist. Clang-14 optimisation was
causing incorrect results in some cases as a result.
[Paul Dale]
*) Fixed SSL_pending() and SSL_has_pending() with DTLS which were failing to
report correct results in some cases
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1o for re-signing certificates with
different key sizes
[Todd Short]
*) Added the loongarch64 target
[Shi Pujin]
*) Fixed a DRBG seed propagation thread safety issue
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed a memory leak in tls13_generate_secret
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed reported performance degradation on aarch64. Restored the
implementation prior to commit 2621751 ("aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: avoid
32-bit lane assignment in CTR mode") for 64bit targets only, since it is
reportedly 2-17% slower and the silicon errata only affects 32bit targets.
The new algorithm is still used for 32 bit targets.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Added a missing header for memcmp that caused compilation failure on some
platforms
[Gregor Jasny]
Build system: x86_64
Build-tested: bcm2711/RPi4B
Run-tested: bcm2711/RPi4B
Signed-off-by: John Audia <therealgraysky@proton.me>
(cherry picked from commit a0814f04ed955eb10b25df0ce6666ed91f11ca1b)
As wolfSSL is having hard time maintaining ABI compatibility between
releases, we need to manually force rebuild of packages depending on
libwolfssl and thus force their upgrade. Otherwise due to the ABI
handling we would endup with possibly two libwolfssl libraries in the
system, including the patched libwolfssl-5.5.1, but still have
vulnerable services running using the vulnerable libwolfssl-5.4.0.
So in order to propagate update of libwolfssl to latest stable release
done in commit ec8fb542ec3e4 ("wolfssl: fix TLSv1.3 RCE in uhttpd by
using 5.5.1-stable (CVE-2022-39173)") which fixes several remotely
exploitable vulnerabilities, we need to bump PKG_RELEASE of all
packages using wolfSSL library.
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
(cherry picked from commit f1b7e1434f66a3cb09cb9e70b40add354a22e458)
(cherry picked from commit 562894b39da381264a34ce31e9334c8a036fa139)
Fixes denial of service attack and buffer overflow against TLS 1.3
servers using session ticket resumption. When built with
--enable-session-ticket and making use of TLS 1.3 server code in
wolfSSL, there is the possibility of a malicious client to craft a
malformed second ClientHello packet that causes the server to crash.
This issue is limited to when using both --enable-session-ticket and TLS
1.3 on the server side. Users with TLS 1.3 servers, and having
--enable-session-ticket, should update to the latest version of wolfSSL.
Thanks to Max at Trail of Bits for the report and "LORIA, INRIA, France"
for research on tlspuffin.
Complete release notes https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.5.1-stable
Fixes: CVE-2022-39173
Fixes: https://github.com/openwrt/luci/issues/5962
References: https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/issues/5629
Tested-by: Kien Truong <duckientruong@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Kien Truong <duckientruong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
(cherry picked from commit ec8fb542ec3e4f584444a97de5ac05dbc2a9cde5)
(cherry picked from commit ce59843662961049a28033077587cabdc5243b15)
This version fixes two vulnerabilities:
-CVE-2022-34293[high]: Potential for DTLS DoS attack
-[medium]: Ciphertext side channel attack on ECC and DH operations.
The patch fixing x86 aesni build has been merged upstream.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9710fe70a68e0a004b1906db192d7a6c8f810ac5)
Signed-off-by: Christian Marangi <ansuelsmth@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit ade7c6db1e6c2c0c8d2338948c37cfa7429ebccc)
This is mostly a bug fix release, including two that were already
patched here:
- 300-fix-SSL_get_verify_result-regression.patch
- 400-wolfcrypt-src-port-devcrypto-devcrypto_aes.c-remove-.patch
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 73c1fe2890baa5c0bfa46f53c5387f5e47de1acb)
(cherry picked from commit 6f8db8fee3b7bd5cb8b1b2be59ee710a8f96860b)
Rename libwolfssl-cpu-crypto to libwolfsslcpu-crypto so that the
regular libwolfssl version comes first when running:
opkg install libwolfssl
Normally, if the package name matches the opkg parameter, that package
is preferred. However, for libraries, the ABI version string is
appended to the package official name, and the short name won't match.
Failing a name match, the candidate packages are sorted in alphabetical
order, and a dash will come before any number. So in order to prefer
the original library, the dash should be removed from the alternative
library.
Fixes: c3e7d86d2b (wolfssl: add libwolfssl-cpu-crypto package)
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d08c9da43cf364712e947d5faa3ab84d995dd0ec)
Move CONFIG_PACKAGE_libwolfssl-benchmark from the top of
PKG_CONFIG_DEPENDS to after PKG_ABI_VERSION is set.
This avoids changing the ABI version hash whether the bnechmark package
package is selected or not.
Fixes: 05df135cac (wolfssl: Rebuild when libwolfssl-benchmark gets changes)
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 50d0b41b38440fa5c6b87bebc229296667851b26)
libwolfssl-cpu-crypto is a variant of libwolfssl with support for
cryptographic CPU instructions on x86_64 and aarch64.
On aarch64, wolfSSL does not perform run-time detection, so the library
will crash when the AES functions are called. A preinst script attempts
to check for support by querying /proc/cpuinfo, if installed in a
running system. When building an image, the script will check the
DISTRIB_TARGET value in /etc/openwrt_release, and will abort
installation if target is bcm27xx.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit c3e7d86d2b1d2645e394464d828bb248d47379d0)
This forces a rebuild of the wolfssl package when the
libwolfssl-benchmark OpenWrt package gets activated or deactivated.
Without this change the wolfssl build will fail when it compiled without
libwolfssl-benchmark before and it gets activated for the next build.
Fixes: 18fd12edb810 ("wolfssl: add benchmark utility")
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
(cherry picked from commit 05df135cacf543871c639e9f34d248cfacca96ea)
Disable the usage of target specific CPU crypto instructions by default
to allow the package being shared again. Since WolfSSL does not offer
a stable ABI or a long term support version suitable for OpenWrt release
timeframes, we're forced to frequently update it which is greatly
complicated by the package being nonshared.
People who want or need CPU crypto instruction support can enable it in
menuconfig while building custom images for the few platforms that support
them.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
(cherry picked from commit 0063e3421de4575e088bb428e758751931bbe6fd)
The armvirt target is also used to run OpenWrt in lxc on other targets
like a Raspberry Pi. If we set WOLFSSL_HAS_CPU_CRYPTO by default the
wolfssl binray is only working when the CPU supports the hardware crypto
extension.
Some targets like the Raspberry Pi do not support the ARM CPU crypto
extension, compile wolfssl without it by default. It is still possible
to activate it in custom builds.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
(cherry picked from commit d1b5d17d03c844ad578bb53b90ea17377bdc5eee)
Currently, uClic++ 0.2.5 fails to compile when using a long filepath.
For example, if the openwrt directory is in the path:
/tmp/this_directory_name_is_very_long/more_long_paths/.../openwrt,
then uclibc++ will cause a very obtuse error.
Although the uclibc++ makefiles do print a "File name too long" error,
it's not the final error that's printed, so it's a bit confusing:
> /bin/sh: 1:
> cannot create src/abi/libsupc/<SNIP>_libsupc++.a.dep: File name too long
> <SNIP: some other makefile output here>
> array_type_info.o: No such file or directory
Although OpenWRT 22.03 and current master branch have removed uClib++,
I thought I'd make a PR for OpenWRT 21.02, since I encountered it
and there seems to be quite a few other people experiencing the same issue.
It especially happens when using the SDK, (or when using an encrypted fs)
since the pre-packaged SDKs have very long filenames.
This patch is already in upstream [1], but has not yet been released.
[1]: https://git.busybox.net/uClibc++/commit/?id=6687fc9276fa52defaf8592f2001c19b826aec93
Signed-off-by: Alois Klink <alois@aloisklink.com>
The curl developers found test case that crashed in their testing when
using zlib patched against CVE-2022-37434, same patch we've backported
in commit 7df6795d4c25 ("zlib: backport fix for heap-based buffer
over-read (CVE-2022-37434)"). So we need to backport following patch in
order to fix issue introduced in that previous CVE-2022-37434 fix.
References: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9271
Fixes: 7df6795d4c25 ("zlib: backport fix for heap-based buffer over-read (CVE-2022-37434)")
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
(cherry picked from commit f443e9de7003c00a935b9ea12f168e09e83b48cd)
(cherry picked from commit 707ec48ab3db6d08bd022df1bc720aee68b3b99d)
zlib through 1.2.12 has a heap-based buffer over-read or buffer overflow
in inflate in inflate.c via a large gzip header extra field. NOTE: only
applications that call inflateGetHeader are affected. Some common
applications bundle the affected zlib source code but may be unable to
call inflateGetHeader.
Fixes: CVE-2022-37434
References: https://github.com/ivd38/zlib_overflow
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
(cherry picked from commit 7df6795d4c25447683fd4b4a4813bebcddaea547)
Changes between 1.1.1p and 1.1.1q [5 Jul 2022]
*) AES OCB mode for 32-bit x86 platforms using the AES-NI assembly optimised
implementation would not encrypt the entirety of the data under some
circumstances. This could reveal sixteen bytes of data that was
preexisting in the memory that wasn't written. In the special case of
"in place" encryption, sixteen bytes of the plaintext would be revealed.
Since OpenSSL does not support OCB based cipher suites for TLS and DTLS,
they are both unaffected.
(CVE-2022-2097)
[Alex Chernyakhovsky, David Benjamin, Alejandro Sedeño]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Lundquist <dustin@null-ptr.net>
(cherry picked from commit 3899f68b54b31de4b4fef4f575f7ea56dc93d965)
Changes between 1.1.1o and 1.1.1p [21 Jun 2022]
*) In addition to the c_rehash shell command injection identified in
CVE-2022-1292, further bugs where the c_rehash script does not
properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection have been
fixed.
When the CVE-2022-1292 was fixed it was not discovered that there
are other places in the script where the file names of certificates
being hashed were possibly passed to a command executed through the shell.
This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where
it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker
could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.
Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.
(CVE-2022-2068)
[Daniel Fiala, Tomáš Mráz]
*) When OpenSSL TLS client is connecting without any supported elliptic
curves and TLS-1.3 protocol is disabled the connection will no longer fail
if a ciphersuite that does not use a key exchange based on elliptic
curves can be negotiated.
[Tomáš Mráz]
Signed-off-by: Andre Heider <a.heider@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit eb7d2abbf06f0a3fe700df5dc6b57ee90016f1f1)
Apply an upstream patch that removes unnecessary CFLAGs, avoiding
generation of incompatible code.
Commit 0bd536723303ccd178e289690d073740c928bb34 is reverted so the
accelerated version builds by default on x86_64.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 639419ec4fd1501a9b9857cea96474271ef737b1)
Changes between 1.1.1p and 1.1.1q [5 Jul 2022]
*) AES OCB mode for 32-bit x86 platforms using the AES-NI assembly optimised
implementation would not encrypt the entirety of the data under some
circumstances. This could reveal sixteen bytes of data that was
preexisting in the memory that wasn't written. In the special case of
"in place" encryption, sixteen bytes of the plaintext would be revealed.
Since OpenSSL does not support OCB based cipher suites for TLS and DTLS,
they are both unaffected.
(CVE-2022-2097)
[Alex Chernyakhovsky, David Benjamin, Alejandro Sedeño]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Lundquist <dustin@null-ptr.net>
(cherry picked from commit 3899f68b54b31de4b4fef4f575f7ea56dc93d965)
Without this, WOLFSSL_HAS_DH can be disabled even if WOLFSSL_HAS_WPAS is
enabled, resulting in an "Anonymous suite requires DH" error when trying
to compile wolfssl.
Signed-off-by: Pascal Ernster <git@hardfalcon.net>
Reviewed-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 21825af2dad0070affc2444ff56dc84a976945a2)
Changes between 1.1.1o and 1.1.1p [21 Jun 2022]
*) In addition to the c_rehash shell command injection identified in
CVE-2022-1292, further bugs where the c_rehash script does not
properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection have been
fixed.
When the CVE-2022-1292 was fixed it was not discovered that there
are other places in the script where the file names of certificates
being hashed were possibly passed to a command executed through the shell.
This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where
it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker
could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.
Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.
(CVE-2022-2068)
[Daniel Fiala, Tomáš Mráz]
*) When OpenSSL TLS client is connecting without any supported elliptic
curves and TLS-1.3 protocol is disabled the connection will no longer fail
if a ciphersuite that does not use a key exchange based on elliptic
curves can be negotiated.
[Tomáš Mráz]
Signed-off-by: Andre Heider <a.heider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tianling Shen <cnsztl@immortalwrt.org>
This release comes with a security fix related to c_rehash. OpenWrt
does not ship or use it, so it was not affected by the bug.
There is a fix for a possible crash in ERR_load_strings() when
configured with no-err, which OpenWrt does by default.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7a5ddc0d06895bde7538d78c8dad2c863d70f946)
WolfSSL is crashing with an illegal opcode in some x86_64 CPUs that have
AES instructions but lack other extensions that are used by WolfSSL
when AES-NI is enabled.
Disable the option by default for now until the issue is properly fixed.
People can enable them in a custom build if they are sure it will work
for them.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0bd536723303ccd178e289690d073740c928bb34)
This enables AES & SHA CPU instructions for compatible armv8, and x86_64
architectures. Add this to the hardware acceleration choice, since they
can't be enabled at the same time.
The package was marked non-shared, since the arm CPUs may or may not
have crypto extensions enabled based on licensing; bcm27xx does not
enable them. There is no run-time detection of this for arm.
NOTE:
Should this be backported to a release branch, it must be done shortly
before a new minor release, because the change to nonshared will remove
libwolfssl from the shared packages, but the nonshared are only built in
a subsequent release!
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0a2edc2714dcda10be902c32525723ce2cbcb138)
